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USE OF DEEDS To EFFECTUATE TRANSFER AT DEATH OF GRANTOR
Introduction
For centuries the problem of determining the disposition of a
decedent's estate has been a constant source of litigation. By far
the majority of the cases are concerned with property rights
to that estate. Basically the question in such cases has been
to determine what the deceased intended to be done with the
property after death, for if his intent can be established, the estate
ordinarily will be disposed of accordingly.
Since the problem of establishing intent is so basic to the
estate planner in trying to carry out the desires of his client, it
is necessary that this intent be made as manifest as possible. In
situations where the grantor wishes to convey specific properties
at his death to designated individuals, the transfer may be ef-
fected either by deed or by will. The question to be ex-
amined in this Note will be the use of the deed as an instrument
to express effectively the decedent's intent. The scope of this
Note necessarily will be confined to transfers taking effect at the
death of the grantor.
Basic legal documents in the field of estate planning are the
will and the deed. Since the field is primarily concerned with the
transfer of property, it is suggested that in certain circumstances
where the transfer is to take place at the death of the grantor,
transfer by deed is a surer method of accomplishing the intention
of the grantor than transfer by will. Problems accompanying the
construction of the will are not present where the deed is
used. Under transfer by deed there should be no difficulty in
determining the intent of the grantor as to the final disposition
of the property and the grantee to whom the property is intended
to be transferred. Certain other undesirable features are present
in a transfer by will that are avoided by transfer by deed, such
as costs of probate proceedings, delay before the property can
be used by the grantee, costs of the executor, and administrative
problems.
Distinguishing Between Deed and Will
Deeds and wills are similar in that both are instruments re-
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lated to the ultimate disposition of property by the owner.' The
major substantive difference in disposition between these two
instruments is that in the will no interest is passed until the
death of the testator,2 whereas in a deed an interest is im-
mediately vested in the grantee.3 This difference may be re-
ferred to in terms of revocability. It is stated that a will is
ambulatory, that is, it may be changed at any time before the
death of the testator because no interest has been conveyed,4
while the deed is irrevocable because some interest has passed.5
This difference is fundamental to the problem under discussion.
Where the conveyance is made contingent upon the death of the
grantor, it is understandable that the courts have been uncertain
as to whether the insirument was a deed or, in effect, a will.6
Faced with this problem the courts have looked to the intent
of the grantor to determine which form of disposition was used 7
Early cases in which this problem arose were concerned
primarily with the time at which the grantor intended to pass
an interest to the grantee. If it could be ascertained that the
interest was to pass before the grantor's death, then the in-
strument was treated as a deed. However if it was ascertained
that the interest did not pass until the death of the grantor, then
the instrument was a will.8
I RonLLsor, W.Ls § 40 (1939), "The term 'will,' as it is popularly
understood, is a disposition of an interest in property, made by the owner
thereof in the form and manner prescribed by law, which disposition is
to take effect at the death of the owner." 3 AMRcAN LAW OF PROPERT
§ 12.35 (Casner ed. 1952). "[A deed] . . . is an instrument in writing by
delivery and acceptance of which the title to some interest or estate in
real property then and there passes."
2 5 THozzpsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 2676 (1940 ed.), "... the instrument
does not pass a present interest or right in property, and .. . such right
or interest does not take effect until after the death of the testator."
3 A mICAw LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra.
4 1 JAm % T, WILs 19 (6th ed. 1893), "It is this ambulatory quality
which forms the characteristic of wills . .. Y
5 16 Abi. Jur., Deeds § 7 (1938), "In other words wills and deeds are
distinguished by the power of revocation residing in the maker in the case
of a will, whereas a deed once executed and delivered is irrevocable . . ..
6 See Bromley v. Mitchell, 155 Mass. 509, 30 N.E. 83 (1892) wherein
deeds executed two days before the death of the grantor were held valid.
Justice Holmes referred to such an instrument as having a "very testa-
mentary look."
7 RoLLzsON, Wir.s § 196 (1939).
8 Burlington University v. Barrett, 22 Iowa 60,72 (1867), "If the instru-
ment passes a present interest, although the right to its possession and
enjoyment may not accrue till some future time, it is a deed or contract;
but if the instrument does not pass an interest or right till the death of
the maker, it is a will, or testamentary paper." See also Comment, 5 Mo.
L. REv. 350 (1940); Comment, 16 U. Dsr. L. J. 87 (1952).
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In these early cases clauses like the following were found to
convey a present interest and not to be testamentary in character:
".. . this deed is not to take effect until the death of the said
[grantor]";9 ". . . to be of none effect until after the death of
[grantor], then to be in full force."; 10 ". . . this deed shall take
and be in full force and effect immediately after the said [grantor]
shall depart this life, and not sooner.";'- "This deed not to take
effect until after my decease-not to be recorded until after my
decease."; 12 "1... not to take effect during my life time, and to
take effect and be in force . . . after my decease ... ;. 1;3 "This
deed to take effect at my death."; 14 "... . and the deed shall go into
full force and effect at my death ..... " ,15 However, the following
clauses were held to be testamentary: "This deed is to take
effect and be in full force from and after my death."; 16 ". . . but
in no event is this deed to go into effect until after my death.";1 7
"To have and hold .. , from and after the death of [grantor].";18
"Said deed of gift to be of full effect at my death .... -;l ,,... to
have the [property] after my death."20 Clearly the diverse in-
terpretation of these clauses is not based on any significant
distinction in their wording. The intent of the grantor certainly
is to retain full control over the property until his death, at
which time the property is to be transferred to the grantee. If
the time of conveyance is the sole criterion, the view that such
deeds are testamentary dispositions is correct. It is difficult to
find a logical basis for construing the grantor's intent to retain
control of the property as being anything other than an intent
that the property should pass at his death.2 ' In effect then, what
has caused some courts to state that such clauses are not testa-
mentary is the fact that they have been insistent that the
9 Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S.W. 998, 998 (1904).
10 Wilson v. Carrico, 140 Ind. 533, 40 N.E. 50, 50 (1895).
11 Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251, 31 S.E. 986, 987 (1898).
12 Shackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616, 617 (1877).
13 Wyman v. Brown, 50 Me. 139, 141 (1863).
14 West v. Wright, 115 Ga. 277, 41 S.E. 602, 603 (1902).
:15 Bunch v. Nicks, 50 Ark. 367, 7 S.W. 563, 563 (1888).
16 Pinkham v. Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729, 76 N.W. 411, 411 (1898).
37 Donald v. Nesbitt, 89 Ga. 290, 15 S.E. 367, 368 (1892).
Is Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo. 219, 172 S.W. 370, 370 (1914).
19 Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317, 318 (1881).
20 Robinson v. Brewster, 140 M. 649, 30 N.E. 683, 684 (1892).
21 In Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo. 219, 172 S.W. 370, 372 (1914), the court
stated that "This language cannot be tortured into meaning that any right,
title, or interest in or to the real estate... was conveyed to or was vested
in the grantees prior to the death of the grantor."
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grantor's intent be carried out.22
The Interest Conveyed
An early problem in the use of a deed to take effect at the
death of the grantor was the determination of the type of interest
to be conveyed to the grantee. At early common law, interests
to take effect in the future were not recognized.23 However, with
the advent of the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills this
type of interest was recognized as valid.24 Today it is generally
recognized that executory interests can be conveyed by a deed.23
However, it is normal to construe the language of the grantor as
conveying some type of present interest 20 in the property.
Where a deed is non-operative until the grantor's death, there
are two possible views: (1) no interest or estate is conveyed
and therefore the instrument is testamentary, and (2) there is a
present conveyance of a future interest which makes the deed
valid. If the deed acts only by operation of the death of the
grantor, that is, if it is ambulatory till his death, then only upon
his death is an interest or estate conveyed.27 Under such a
construction, the grantee has nothing more than a mere ex-
pectancy of an estate. The second view is more sound however.
22 Crowley v. Engelke 394 IM. 264, 68 N.E.2d, 241, 251 (1946), wherein
the court stated, "The test to be applied in determining this question is
whether the grantor intended the document, by which the conveyance
is made, to be presently operative or merely to be ambulatory in character,
and revocable until the death of the grantor." See also, Noffsinger v. Noff-
singer, 303 Ky. 344, 197 S.W.2d 785 (1946); White v. Wester, 170 Okla. 250,
39 P.2d 22 (1934); Blair v. Blair, 111 Vt. 53, 10 A.2d 188 (1940).
23 Confusion may arise, and has arisen, over the use of the words
"interest" and "estate." Courts have used these words more or less inter-
changeably and it is important to determine in just what sense they are
using the terms. "The term 'interest' in land may be distinguished from
and should not be confused with the term 'estate' therein, and therefore,
if so intended by the makers, a deed may pass a 'present interest' in prop-
erty while the 'estate therein' is a future one.' White v. Wester, 170 Okla
250, 39 P.2d 22, 25 (1934).
24 Snmis AN SLn', THE LAW OF Fuvuan INSTusrs § 221 (1956).
25 Id. § 30.
26 Id. § 232, "Or it may be said that, after all, the Statute of Uses has
little to do with conveyancing in these modern days even in those juris-
dictions where it can be said to be a part of the law, and that the modern
doctrine is, not merely that one may create an estate of freehold to begin
in the future by a conveyance operating under the Statute of Uses, but
simply that the rule prohibiting the creation by deed of an estate of free-
hold to begin in the future is no longer law."
27 "The essential characteristic of an instrument testamentary in its
nature is that it operates only upon, and by reason of, the death of the
maker. Up to that time, it is ambulatory. By its execution, the maker has
Continued on page 304
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The essence of a future interest is potential possession in the
future; that future interest is part of the total present owner-
ship.28 The holder of the executory interest does not become
vested with the estate until the death of the grantor but he does
have a presently vested future interest. Presumably this is what
the grantor intends. He at least wants to create some new right
in the grantee. However, there must be some indication of a
corresponding surrender of an interest by the grantor. It must
be shown that some interest has been presently conveyed;
otherwise the instrument is ambulatory and invalid as a deed.9
The Reservation of a Life Estate
Where the grantor creates an executory interest to take effect
at his death, the situation is analagous to the reservation of a
life estate by the grantor and conveyance of the remainder to
the grantee. In this latter situation, the courts have held that the.
grantor did intend that an interest should pass immediately 0
to the grantee. If intent is to be the controlling factor then this
interpretation is reasonable. For what other reason would a
specific reservation of a life estate be made by a grantor?3 1 Yet
notwithstanding the reservation, some coirts have held that such
I
parted with no rights, and divested himself of no modicum of his estate;
and, per contra, no rights have accrued to, and no estate has vested in,
any other person. The death of the maker establishes for the first time the
character of the instrument. It at once ceases to be ambulatory. It acquires
a fixed status, and operates as a conveyance of title." Nichols v. Emery, 109
Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089, 1091 (1895).
28 SMES AND SmrrH, op. cit. supra § 1.
29 Nobell v. Town of Beaver, 133 Okla. 247, 271 Pac. 420 (1928).
3o Fonda v. Miller, 411 IM. 74, 103 N.E.2d 98 (1952); Hall v. Hall, 206
Iowa 1, 218 N.W. 35 (1928); Meairs v. Kruckenberg, 171 Kan. 450, 233 P.2d
472 (1951); Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 303 Ky. 344, 197 S.W.2d 785 (1946);
Stoutenburg v. Stoutenburg, 176 Misc. 430, 27 N.Y.S.2d 734, (Sup. Ct. 1941),
aff'd, 265 App. Div. 570, 40 N.Y.S.2d 146 (3d Dep't 1943).
In Michigan, where the view is that a conveyance taking effect at the
death of the grantor is void because of the testamentary character of the
instrument, a specific reservation of a life estate in the deed is valid.
Comment, 16 U. DEr. L. J. 87 (1952).
31 In Thorpe v. Daniel, 339 Mo. 763, 99 S.W.2d 42, 44 (1936), the court
stated, obiter, that a provision for a life estate to the grantor in an instru-
ment purporting to convey a fee title, was strong evidence of an intention
to pass title.
"Of great importance in our thinking on this subject is the long
uninterrupted line of cases in this state holding that where there
is a deed reserving a life estate in the grantor, there is a strong
presumption that it is intended that the title should vest immediately
in the remainderman, for the reason that if such intention had
not existed there would be no reason for the reservation." Fonda v.
Miller, 411 Ill. 74, 103 N.E.2d 98, 102 (1951).
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instruments are testamentary.32 In reaching such a decision, these
courts seemingly have been troubled by the fact that an estate
was to be conveyed only by the occurrence of the grantor's
death, i.e., interpreting this to mean no present conveyance of an
interest.33 Such a position is unrealistic. The court assumes that
the instrument is operative only by reason of the grantor's death.
It does not take into account the fact that a genuine interest
in property passes presently, and that enjoyment alone is post-
poned until the happening of a certain future event. This in-
terpretation mistakenly equates the operative effect of a deed, i.e.,
a present conveyance of an estate or interest in property, with
the time at which such effect will take place. The time when
an estate becomes vested should not determine whether the
deed is operative, but rather the intent of the grantor should
govern. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that the grantor in-
tends to make a present conveyance with the construction given
by the courts, that the conveyance is operative only upon his
death. This construction nullifies any intention the grantor might
have of making an inter-vivos transfer.
The Revocable Deed
Courts are in agreement that where a deed clearly passes, or
is construed to pass, a present interest to the grantee, merely
postponing enjoyment, the instrument is -valid as a deed. Fre-
quently, a situation may arise where the grantor reserves
both a life estate and a power to revoke the instrument. In this
case it may be contended that no present interest has passed or
been given up by the grantor. The instrument being revocable,
it is said to be ambulatory, and therefore must be treated as a
testamentary disposition. 34 A closer analysis of this situation
32 Steinke v. Sztanka, 364 ]MI. 334, 4 N.E2d 472 (1936).
33 Ballentine states that in situations where the deed is not to take
effect until death there is a confusion of two intents: (1) an intent to give
the estate to commence in futuro but reserving the possession and the
use of the property during the grantor's life, and (2) an intent not to
make a present conveyance, but to keep the deed ambulatory until the
grantor's death. He is of the opinion that the probable intention in such
cases is effected by holding the instrument operative in praesenti as a grant
of a future estate. Ballentine, When Are Deeds Testamentary, 18 MIcH. L.
Rav. 470 (1920).
But see Edwards v. Butler, 244 N.C. 205, 92 S.E.2d 922 (1956), where
the court held that when a fee was conveyed in the granting clause and a
specific reservation of a life estate was made in a paragraph inserted be-
tween the granting and habendum clause, such reservation was repugnant
to the granting clause.
34 Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935); Goins v.
Melton, 343 Mo. 413, 121 S.W.2d 821 (1938).
19573
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
should yield a different result. There are two possible views as to
the intent of the grantor who reserves the power to revoke: (1)
that an interest is passed and a specific reservation of a power to
revoke is necessary to retain in the grantor some control over the
rights which were conveyed; (2) that the instrument merely
restates the rights of the grantor in the property. This second
view seems incongruous with the apparent intent of the grantor.
As owner of the property, the grantor is entitled to all the
privileges of ownership before conveyance. In an instrument
purporting to be a conveyance, there would seem to be no neces-
sity for the grantor to restate his privileges, unless it be that some
other privileges were conveyed.35 Reason dictates that by a con-
veyance the grantor did intend to part with something. It should
be all the more manifest that the grantor did convey some in-
terest because he resorted to a reservation of the power to revoke;
otherwise, this privilege, too, would have been lost by the trans-
fer.36
Actually the grantor is still in virtually complete control of
the property. The question then arises as to the nature of the
interest of which the grantor divested himself. The courts have
given effect to the grantor's intent by finding a present con-
veyance of a future interest,37 or a defeasable fee subject to the
grantor's life estate.3 8 This reasoning is sound and effect is given
to the grantor's intention to make a present transfer.
The Deed in Escrow
It is a general rule that delivery is essential before a deed can
become operative as a conveyance of property.39 No actual
35 St. Louis City County National Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260
S.W.2d 483 (1953).
36 St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260 S.W.2d 483
(1953); see case comment 22 U. KAN. Crr L. REv. 171 (1954).
37 Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal. App.2d 828,155 P.2a 671, 674 (1945) (dictum),
where the court stated that if grantor intended to make a present convey-
ance of a future interest, even though the grantor reserved the power to
revoke the deed, such instrument would be valid as a deed. In St. Louis
County Nat'l Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260 S.W.2d 483 (1953), the court
held an instrument reserving the power to revoke was valid as a deed, as
there was a present grant of a future interest with enjoyment of possession
postponed.
38 "It merely afforded the means whereby such vested future estate
could be defeated and divested before it ripened into an estate in pos-
session." Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 140 Pac.
242, 246 (1914). See also St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207,
260 S.W.2d 483 (1953).
39 A. iscA LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.64 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 T=AFy,
PaoPnRTY § 1033 (1939).
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physical delivery is required. If it can be shown that the grantor
intended to make a delivery, then a "constructive" delivery is
presumed and the deed is operative.40 The problem is analagous
to those already discussed concerning the intent of the grantor
in the use of a deed taking effect at his death.
In the original escrow situation, a deed was delivered to a
third party (the escrowee) to be delivered to the grantee upon
"he performance of some future condition. 4 ' Such deliveries are
held to be valid.4 In circumstances where the deed is delivered
to an escrowee to be delivered to the grantee, not upon some
condition to be performed by the grantee, but upon the oc-
currence of some future event, such as the death of the grantor,
a valid escrow delivery also is made.43 It has been said that
the function of delivery is to determine whether or not the
instrument shall be operative, that is, whether a present con-
veyance is made; it is not concerned with vesting an estate
in the grantee, for that is expressed by the terms of the instru-
ment, but with actual determination of whether the deed should
have any effect or not.44 Nor will delivery determine what kind
of estate or estates the deed will create when it does become
operative.45
It would be hard to determine any significant advantage in the
use of the escrow deed. It would seem that in both the escrow
and the revocable deed situation the intent of the grantor is the
same. He wishes to maintain the control of the property during
his life and at his death to convey the property to the grantee. In
40 "The general rule is that words or conduct of the grantor which
evidence his intention to make his deed presently operative and effectual
so as to vest title in the grantee and to surrender his own control over
the title amount to delivery." A=rcAN LAw OF PsoPaRTy, op. cit. supra.
41 "Where a deed is placed in the hands of a depositary for condi-
tional future delivery to the grantee, a distinction has by some
courts been recognized between cases where the future delivery
depends upon the performance of some condition, and those where
it depends upon the death of the grantor. In the former case the deed
does not become operative until rightfully delivered by the de-
positary [escrowee] to the grantee, while in the latter, upon de-
livery to the depositary, it is deemed to be the grantor's deed
presently, taking effect for many, if not for most purposes, from the
time of its delivery to the depositary." Grilley v. Atkins, 78 Conn.
380, 62 AUt. 337, 338 (1905).
42 Bigelow, Conditional Delivery, 26 HARV. L. REv. 576 (1913).
43 "The deed in either of these cases is usually called an 'escrow,' but
perhaps more frequently and more properly that word is used to designate
the deed in the former, rather than in the latter case." Grilley v. Atkins, 78
Conn. 380, 62 AUt. 337, 338 (1905).
44 Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary., 18 MlicH. L. REv. 479 (1918).
45 Id. at 470.
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the escrow situation the grantor's intent is manifested by the
physical act of delivery to the escrowee. In the revocable deed
situation it is the express statements in the deed which manifest
the grantor's intent. From this observation, the written intent
of the grantor would seem to be the better method. However, the
law of the state should be checked to determine any particular
advantage that may be gained by the use of one method over
the other.
The Deed in Trust
A trust arrangement also may be useful in enabling the
grantor to retain pontrol of the property for life, and then at
death have the property transferred to the grantee. Again the
problem is the effective disposal of property at the grantor's
death. In the trust plan the settlor conveys property by a deed
to the trustee reserving a life estate in the property and re-
serving power to revoke the instrument.4 6 An alternate method
would be to convey by deed to the beneficiaries who are to hold
the property in trust for the settlor until his death.4 7 Both these
arrangements have been held valid as inter vivos trusts.48 It is
generally agreed that the power to revoke a trust, coupled with
the reservation of a life estate, does not necessarily make the
trust testamentary. 49 But if the settlor reserves power and con-
trol over the trustee to such an extent that the trustee is in
effect the agent of the settlor, the trust will be testamentary.5 0
Problems frequently arise where the settlor and the trustee are
the same person. In this instance it is difficult to say that the
settlor does not have control over the trustee. In spite of this
inconsistency some courts have recognized this arrangement as
valid.51 It is reasoned that even though the trustee and the
settlor are in fact one and the same person, the settlor-trustee
must follow the terms of the trust agreement, and to that extent
the settlor is limited in his control over the property.5 2 If the
trustee-settlor sets forth the extent of his control in the trust
agreement, it is hard to see how he is limited in any substantial
46 United Bldg. & Loan A'ssn v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (WJ). Ark.
1946); Farkas v. Williams, 5 I11.2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955) (settlor de-
clared himself trustee); Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956).
47 In re Sheasley's Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448 (1951).
48 Id.
49 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956); REsTATEmENT, TaUSTS, § 57 (1935).
50 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
53 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill.2d 417, 125 N.E2d 600 (1955); Ridge v. Bright,
244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956).
52 Farkas v. Williams, supra note 51.
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sense, since the trust instrument is merely an expression of his
own intent.
By the use of the deed a certain formality is given to the
transaction which indicates the settlor's intent to convey a legal
interest to the trustee, and not merely to make the trustee his
agent.5 3 In practical effect the requirements of the Statute of
Wills have not been violated by giving effect to a revocable deed
in trust since both the deed and the will are concerned primarily
with giving effect to the intent of the grantor.5
Tax Consequences
To determine what the tax liability would be in the use of the
deed as discussed above, it should be first ascertained whether or
not a sale or exchange was made, or whether the deed was a
gift. If a sale or exchange is made, the income would be taxed
according to the ordinary provisions for such income. But if
the deed is a gift, a different result ensues. At first glance it
would seem that this deed granting an interest would be taxable
to the grantor solely under the gift tax as an inter-vivos gift, even
though the enjoyment of the property is suspended by the grantor.
However gifts wherein a life estate is reserved,55 or where the
53 RESTATEIENT, TRUSTS § 57 (2), comment g (1935).
54 In Farkas v. Williams, 5 l11.2d 417, 125 N.E2d 600 (1955), it is stated
at 608,
"Historically, the purpose behind the enactment of the statute on
wills was the prevention of fraud. The requirement as to witnesses
was deemed necessary because a will is ordinarily an expression
of the secret wish of the testator, signed out of the presence of all
concerned. The possibility of forgery and fraud are ever present
in such situations.. .-. [By such issuance of stock certificates and
declarations in trust) He thus manifested his intention in a solemn
and formal manner."
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036, Transfers With A Retained Life Interest:
(a) GENERAL RuLE - "The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without.
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom."
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interest is not to take effect until death,56 also are held taxable to
the decedent's estate, subject of course to a credit for the gift
tax paid on the inter-vivos transfer.57 Hence, where the grantor
makes certain transfers of property but reserves to himself a life
estate or makes such transfer effective on his death, tax liability
may effect the degree of control he wishes to maintain over the
property. In some situations it may be preferable, tax-wise, to
make an outright gift of the property.
Conclusion
If the estate planner intends to carry out the wishes of his
client, it is rudimentary that he must make as manifest as
possible the client's intent as to the disposition of the property.
The difficulty arises from the conflict between (1) what the
instrument purports to do, and (2) what the grantor intended
it to do. A strict construction of the deed or will must, in many
cases, deny the grantor's wishes. Yet the court cannot be ex-
pected to have the facility to examine the subjective intent and
desires of the grantor. It can only look to the extrinsic evidence
produced, and from this evidence determine the grantor's intent.
Therefore it is incumbent upon the estate planner to use the
instruments which best express this intent. Increasing use of
transfer by deed, to take effect at the grantor's death, is a step
in the right direction. It should not be considered as a substitute
for a will. Indeed it was never intended to be such. But in situa-
tions where transfers of property are desired to be made to
specified individuals, the use of a deed is appropriate. If con-
venience and practicality are essential, if efficient administration
of the grantor's estate and prompt disposition at his death are
desired, no better method can be found.
John C. Rogers
56 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2037:
(a) GssAnL RusE - "The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein
which the decedent has at any time after September 7, 1916, made
a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or other-
wise, if -(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through owner-
ship of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the de-
cedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the prob-
erty (but in the case of transfer made before October 8, 1949,
only if such reversionary interest arose by the express terms
of the instrument of transfer), and the value of such re-
versionary interest immediately before the death of the de-
cedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of such property."
57 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2012.
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